ONTOLOGICAL (IN)SECURITY AND THE KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY: THE USE OF SECURITY DISCOURSE (1925-1984)

Gökçe Balaban

Introduction

There is separatism in every field in our country. The most pervasive one among those is the one that is made under Kurdism.[1]

How could one account for the discourse of security used by Turkish state elites considering the Kurdish issue before 1984, when terrorist attacks by the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistani (PKK) had not yet begun, and hence there was no physical security threat against the state?[2] This article aims to answer this question from the perspective of ontological (in)security. According to ontological security theory, actors do not only seek physical security (such as the security of their body or territory), but they also strive for the security of their identity. To be ontologically secure, agents' self-identity should have certainty and continuity over time.[3] The actors' self is maintained through autobio-

---

---

graphical narratives – stories they tell to and about themselves[4], which give life to routinized practices.[5] Based on this approach, the article contends that after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, the constituting traits of Kurdish collective identity, such as the tribal and religious structure in the Kurdish region, and the Kurdish language, started to generate uncertainty in Turkish self-identity because these characteristics of Kurdishness disrupted and challenged the narratives about being a Turk. Uncertainty created ontological insecurity, which led to the use of security discourse by the state and the securitization of the traits of Kurdish identity.[6] Securitization also provided a legitimate basis for extraordinary measures like resettlement policies, imprisoning those who expressed their Kurdish identity, banning the use of the Kurdish language, and so on. Through securitization, state elites aimed to reinstate ontological security because it is through those extraordinary measures that Kurdish identity claims were suppressed, and this suppression served to strengthen the certainty and continuity of the Turkish self. This article will analyze both securitization (i.e. how Kurdishness was associated with the discourse of security), and its results (i.e. the extraordinary measures taken with regard to the Kurdish issue).

Taking 1925 as its starting point, this article concentrates on state discourses/practices in the Kurdish issue between 1925 and 1984, when there was no terrorism or direct security threat against the state, but the use of security discourse in the Kurdish issue was still high on the political agenda. This period will also be analysed in two sub-periods: first between 1925 and 1960, and second between 1960–1984. Before 1960, the state usually securitized the tribal and religious structures of Kurds since it saw those structures as important carriers of Kurdish

---

[4]   Jelena Subotic, "Narrative, Ontological Security and Foreign Policy Change," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 4 (October 2016): 611.

[5]   Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2008).

[6]   Securitization occurs when an issue is presented as a security issue by state-elites. According to Weaver, security is a speech-act, meaning that it has a performative function. By uttering the word "security" state-elites move a particular development –in this case the Kurdish issue– into a specific area and claim a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it. See Ole Weaver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86.

identity.[7] This traditional structure started to lose its grip among Kurds after the second half of the 1950s, and new Kurdish intelligentsia, who emphasized their Kurdishness more vocally, rose in the city centers. Thus, what is seen in state discourse after 1960 is the association of the claims of Kurdishness and speaking/writing in Kurdish to the discourse of security by the state elites. From this perspective, it can be said that this study engages in a retrospective analysis and tries to explore historical discourses through a new lens. The article, however, should not only be considered historical research which aims to re-evaluate the past. The historical background presented herein could also shed light on the securitization of the Kurdish issue in today's political discourse. After all, ontological insecurity of the state was not replaced with physical security considerations when the terror attacks started in 1984. On the contrary, the PKK's separatist claims further generated ontological insecurity for Turkey because it disrupted the Turkish narrative, which envisaged Muslim groups assimilating into Turkishness through religious bonds.[8] Thus, this article could make a contribution to one's understanding of the Kurdish issue by bringing in the ontological security perspective for ontological (in)security concerns of the Turkish state have always been an active force in shaping state discourses and practices regarding the Kurdish issue.

The ontological insecurity of the Turkish state vis-à-vis Kurdish identity will be traced through Critical Discourse Analysis methodol-

---

[7]   One thing should be noted here: "security" as a term started to be used in political discourse after the 1960 coup d'etat in Turkey. Before that time, there was no direct reference to security in the state discourse vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue. However, as this article tries to show, Kurdish political and religious structures were always constituted as "obstacles" against the ideals of the Republic and hence were portrayed as threats against the identity of the new regime. As it will be demonstrated, one could also see that Kurdish tribal chieftains had been labelled as persons *threatening* the peace in their region and *damaging national interests* in the state discourse before national security terminology was popularized. For the history of national security terminology in Turkey see Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye'de Milli Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi [The Development of the Concept of National Security in Turkey]," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti* [Military, State and Security Politics in Turkey], eds. İsmet Akça and Evren Balta Paker (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 307–351.

[8]   For terrorist attacks' triggering ontological insecurity see Amir Lupovici, "Ontological Dissonance, Clashing Identities, and Israel's Unilateral Steps towards the Palestinians," *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 4 (October 2012): 824.

ogy (CDA), with a specific focus on the "discourse historical approach" of Reisigl and Wodak[9], and the "social actor network" model of Theo Van Leeuwen.[10] Accordingly, the article applies CDA to the discourses used by the Turkish state officials/institutions vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue. Here the article should also clarify which texts are chosen for analysis and why, and how those texts are analyzed.

To address the first question, the article relies on the classification of "fields of action" used by Reisigl and Wodak.[11] Accordingly, "fields of action" are "the segments of the societal reality, which contribute to constituting the 'frame' of the discourse."[12] In terms of political action, Reisigl and Wodak define several fields of action which consist of different genres that altogether establish political discourses. The focus in this article will be on the political/executive/judiciary administration fields[13] and the field of law-making procedure, which includes different genres such as official reports prepared by state bureaucrats, speeches of heads of governments, laws, judicial decisions and prosecution charges. Analyzing various texts written/spoken by different agents and institutions of the state gives the reader an overall picture of state discourse on the Kurdish issue and helps to trace intertextuality between different state documents. Yet, since all texts could not be analyzed, specific focus will be on the texts that were written in "critical situations" which refer to the times when the institutionalized routines and self-identity of the state were disturbed.[14] Focusing on critical situations may give more insight on the state's approach towards the Kurdish issue as it is at those times that the state felt ontologically insecure and to overcome this, legitimized extraordinary measures by new discursive practices.

––––––––––––––––––

[9]   Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Anti-Semitism* (London: Routledge, 2011).
[10]   Theo V. Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[11]   Reisigl and Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination*, 35–41.
[12]   Reisigl and Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination*, 36.
[13]   In Reisigl and Wodak's work, this field is defined as political/executive administration only, yet since the judiciary is actively used to "manage" the Kurdish issue in Turkey, I also added the judiciary field to the analysis.
[14]   Steele, *Ontological Security,* 12. As it will be demonstrated, in the Kurdish issue, critical situations happened when Kurds emphasized their self-identity as a separate identity from the Turkish one and hence disturbed the autobiographical narrative of the state.

With regards to the second question, the discourse analysis conducted in this article integrates the socio-historical background of the texts (the context which rendered the texts possible), and the discursive strategies employed in them. As for the latter, the focus of analysis will be on referential strategies (how actors are represented), predicational strategies (what traits are attributed to those actors), and argumentation strategies (with which argumentation or legitimization are actors represented as they are in the texts). These strategies are important because they can demonstrate how Kurds are represented and how this specific representation was constituted as a threat against the Turkish self in the official discourse.

On the referential strategy side, the article relies on Van Leeuwen's "social actor network model" which presents an extensive analysis of how actors are included and excluded in the texts[15]. Considering the limits of the article, exclusion will be the center of attention because, as it will be seen, it is mainly through excluding Kurdish identity that the Turkish self aimed to overcome its ontological insecurity. Exclusion, according to Leeuwen, could take two forms: suppression and backgrounding.[16] Suppression happens when there is no reference to the social actor in question in the text; backgrounding happens when excluded actors may not be mentioned in a related action but they are mentioned elsewhere in the text.[17] In addition to showing the exclusion of Kurdish identity in state discourse, the article will also show what characteristics are attributed to Kurdish identity and how those traits are associated with the discourse of security.

The article begins by explaining the theory of ontological (in)security with a particular focus on why it is used to understand state-minority group relations. The second part briefly explores what Turkishness meant to the state elites during the establishment years, and thus shows how the Turkish self was constructed. This is necessary to understand how and why Kurdish identity was perceived and constituted as a threat to Turkish identity after the Sheikh Said rebellion. The third part ana-

---

[15]   Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice*, 23–55.
[16]   Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice*, 28–32.
[17]   Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice*, 29.

lyzes the securitization of the tribal and religious structure of Kurds between 1925 and 1960, which resulted in the resettlement of local notables within the country. The final part focuses on the securitization of Kurdish identity between 1960 and 1984. In this period, Kurds began to more vocally emphasize their Kurdishness, and this induced anxiety and generated ontological insecurity for the state. Since the source of the threat was the reiteration of Kurdish identity, the state constantly pressured those actors who were vocal in the Kurdish issue using trials, detentions and as will be seen, by banning the use of the Kurdish language.

Theoretical background: Ontological (in)security

The roots of ontological security lie in psychoanalysis and the term was first used by psychiatrist Ronald David Laing. According to Laing, an ontologically secure person is one who has a "sense of his presence as alive, whole and, in a temporal sense a continuous person."[18] An ontologically insecure person, on the other hand, "lacks the experience of his own temporal continuity and his/her identity and autonomy is under question."[19] Thus, for Laing two points come into prominence in defining ontological security: first, a person's sense of being as an entity will not be questioned; and second, this sense of being will have continuity in time. Continuity of self was also emphasized by Anthony Giddens, who further elaborated on the concept.[20] For Giddens, continuity is important because it provides the consistency crucial for self-identity.[21] Based on this, Giddens describes ontological security as the "confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action."[22]

---

[18]   Ronald D. Laing, *The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 42.
[19]   Laing, *The Divided Self,* 42.
[20]   Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (London: Standford University Press, 1991).
[21]   Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity,* 92.
[22]   Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, 92.

Both Laing and Giddens make an individual level analysis and use the concept to understand insecurities experienced by individuals. Starting from the early 2000s, the concept began to be used by IR scholars, who mostly applied the concept to the state level to understand the foreign policy behavior of states. Among those, Mitzen's and Steele's works are particularly important due to their role in shaping ontological security literature in IR.[23] Deriving from the works of Giddens, both scholars emphasize states' need to have consistent, stable concepts of self. [24] The stability and continuity of identity crucial for ontological security is provided by routines which stabilize identities, and which produce trust among the states.[25] The disruption of routines generates anxiety, which leads to a disconnect from the self and hence becomes a source of ontological insecurity.[26] Someone who suffers from anxiety must reform behavior in order to regenerate ontological security.

Despite those common points, Steele's and Mitzen's works diverge on the role of "external others" in the constitution of state identity. Mitzen takes an externalist approach and emphasizes the role of "others" in the formation of state identity and self-concepts within international society. On the other hand, Steele focuses on the internal dynamics of identity formation within the state. According to this view, a state's conception of its self-identity is "constructed internally through the development of autobiographical narratives, which are the narratives about self."[27] It is through those narratives that states link a policy to the conception of self and give their actions a meaning consistent with their identity.[28] The autobiographical narrative stabilizes the sense of self and provides continuity and certainty for identity. When a state

---

[23] Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations,* 12, no. 3 (September 2006): 341–370; Brent J. Steele, "Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British and the American Civil War," *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 3 (September 2005): 519–540.

[24] Mitzen, "Ontological Security," 344; Steele, *Ontological Security*, 3.

[25] Steele, *Ontological Security*, 3, 51; Steele, "Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity," 526; Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics," 346–347.

[26] Steele, *Ontological Security*, 52.

[27] Will K. Delehanty and Brent J. Steele, "Engaging the Narrative in Ontological (In)Security Theory: Insights from Feminist IR," *Cambridge Review of International Studies* 22, no. 3 (September 2009): 523.

[28] Steele, *Ontological Security*, 10–11.

acts incongruently with its autobiographical narrative, it experiences shame, which also generates ontological insecurity along with anxiety.[29] Since this article analyzes Turkish ontological (in)security within domestic politics, it focuses on how Turkishness was constituted internally through autobiographical narratives, rather than its intersubjective formation vis-à-vis external others.

In both Steele and Mitzen's analyses, the state is granted personhood and the individual level is projected onto the state level. Thus, ontological security in those analyses is used to understand the relations between states. One may then ask whether it is appropriate to use ontological security to understand state – minority group relations, as is the aim of this article. To start with, it should be mentioned that the idea of "state as level of analysis" has also been found problematic by some scholars[30] who maintain that it is not the states or collective actors, but rather individuals living in the community who feel and experience ontological insecurity. This article, on the other hand, ascribes self-identity to the Turkish nation-state, but analyzes its ontological insecurity towards a minority group within the domestic context. This is not pointless when one looks at Jef Huysmans' pioneering work on the topic[31]. According to Huysmans, the role of the state is not only to mediate threats but also to mediate chaos, and the latter could be realized by giving meaning and intelligibility to relations with others and by bringing order to the environment, whereby an "acceptable degree of certainty" could be achieved[32]. However, strangers both *inside* and outside a society may articulate ambivalence and challenge the ordering activity, which relies on reducing uncertainty.[33] Thus, those strangers create the very chaos that states attempt to eliminate as a possibility. Since, according to Huys-

---

[29] Steele, *Ontological Security*, 10–11.
[30] Alanna Krolikowski, "State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Skeptical View," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 1 (July 2008): 190–133; Stuart Croft, "Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of Britain's Muslims," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 2 (June 2012): 219–235.
[31] Jef Huysmans, "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (June 1998): 226–255.
[32] Huysmans, "Security!," 241.
[33] Huysmans, "Security!," 241.

mans, the mediation of order and chaos defines ontological security, those elements (insider and outsider strangers) which are ambivalent and which create uncertainty, hence challenging ontological security, must be eliminated, possibly through enemy construction in the language.[34] Thus, ontological insecurity experienced by the state leads to the securitization of strangers inside and outside society. From this perspective then, it is not inconsequential to use an ontological security framework to understand the Turkish state's (self-identity) securitization of the traits of Kurdish identity – "strangers" that are inside society.

The Turkish self in the early republican period

In order to understand actors' ontological security-providing behaviors, it is necessary to focus on their "formative stages of life" because, as Giddens mentions, it is at these times that basic trust, which refers to agents' confidence in the continuity of others, and self-identity emerges.[35] This article takes Turkey's formative stages as the early Republican period of the 1920s and 1930s, where there were various efforts to establish self-identity through constituting biographical narratives.

A close look at state discourses and practices in the 1920s and 1930s demonstrates that the main pillar of Turkishness was the religion of Islam. The first indications of the link between Turkishness and Islam could be seen during the period of the War of Independence between 1919 and 1922. In this time period it appears that the Turkish nation referred to all Muslim communities living in the Ottoman Empire. A parliamentary discussion in 1920 reveals this situation clearly. The deputy Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi requested that parliament clarify the meaning of Turk. His question and the reactions from parliament are enlightening and aid in the understanding of the role of Islam in defining Turkishness:

As far as I understand, whenever Turkish history was mentioned in this platform, what is meant is various Islamic groups such as Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Laz, isn't it? *(The crowd shouts yes, it is, applauds)*. If this is not what

---

34 Huysmans, "Security!," 242.
35 Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, 38.

Turk means, I request the wording of Islamic elements instead of Turk during the speeches.[36]

The discussion reveals that the name Turk was used as an umbrella identity for all Muslim groups living in the country right before the foundation of the Republic. This belief also continued in the early Republican period and the new Turkish state saw the Muslim majority as its societal ground.[37] Another important consequence of this was that Kemalists started to view all Anatolian Muslims as Turks, an idea which would start the assimilation of non-Turkish Muslim groups into Turkishness.[38]

Yet, Islam was not the only criteria used to define Turkishness. The discourses and practices of the period reveal that language and culture were other essential elements of the Turkish self. Language and culture were seen as the cornerstones of the nation by influential thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp, whose ideas influenced the Kemalist elites in the 1920s. For him a nation "is not a racial or ethnic or geographic or political or volitional entity but is composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality and aesthetics; that is to say, of those who have received the same education."[39] Thus, for Gökalp, one could be accepted as a Turk if she is educated as a Turk, she could express herself in Turkish, and she shares the Turkish ideal.[40] In other words, for Gökalp, a nation is socialization through language and culture.

Gökalp's ideas can be traced in the state discourses of the 1920s and 1930s. The speech of Hamdullah Suphi, who was an influential spokesman of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman and early Republican period, during the parliamentary debate of Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution reveals the importance of language in Turkishness. Suphi

---

[36]   TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi [Turkish Grand Assembly, Minutes of Debates], Vol. 2, Session 10 (December 1920): 170.
[37]   Özlem Kaygusuz, "Modern Türkiye Vatandaşlığının Erken Öncülleri: Milli Mücadele Döneminde Vatandaşlığın Kuruluşu [The Early Antecedents of Modern Turkish Citizenship: The Construction of National Citizenship in National Struggle]," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 60, no. 2 (2005): 195–217.
[38]   Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 102.
[39]   Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism* (n.p.: Bill Archive, 1968), 15.
[40]   Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, 16.

was against the categorization of Greeks and Armenians as Turks, since essentially they were not Turks. Yet, there was a way to become a Turk:

Someone (meaning a Jew), an old friend of mine, asked me "Could you please tell me, how can I become a Turk?" I said, "You can become a Turk." As long as Jews, who were expelled from Spain and came here with Spanish, accept (Turkish) language of the country…they could be Turks…Adopt Turkish culture. After that, we can call you Turk.[41]

Thus, according to Suphi, one could become a Turk if he/she speaks Turkish and adopts Turkish culture.

Although Gökalp's idea of nation was inclusionary, Kemalist nationalism took a more exclusionary character in the 1930s when ethnicity and race became important traits of Turkishness. The distinctiveness and superiority of the Turkish race vis-à-vis other nations was the dominant discourse of the 1930s and via legal amendments, ethnic Turks were made the privileged group within the nation.[42]

Lastly, modernization understood as Westernization could also be considered an important pillar of Turkishness in the early Republican period. As Keyman and Özkırımlı mention, "the primary goal of Kemalist elite was to 'reach the contemporary level of civilization' by adopting the main political, economic and ideological elements of Western civilization."[43] Indeed, according to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, this is so crucial that those who ignore civilization (read as Westernization) "will be drowning by the flood of it."[44] This process of Westernization not only started an institutional change but also dictated a new "modern" national identity, defined by rationalism, secularism and

---

[41]   TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi [Turkish Grand Assembly, Minutes of Debates], Vol. 8/1, Session 42 (April 1924), 909.

[42]   Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 68–80. In this period, non-Turks were excluded from some important public services such as being a government employee, which demonstrates the importance of ethnicity in defining Turkishness. See Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism.*

[43]   Fuat Keyman and Umut Özkırımlı, "The 'Kurdish Question' Revisited: Modernity, Nationalism and Citizenship in Turkey," in *Understanding Turkey's Kurdish Question,* eds. Fevzi Bilgin and Ali Sarıhan (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013).

[44]   The quote is from Atatürk's speech on the second anniversary of the victory of the War of Independence. *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri Vol 2.* (Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık, 2006).

progress. This also meant the removal of old traditions and institutions which were mostly defined by religion and Islamic values[45]. As a result, the symbols and institutions that belonged to the Ottoman past such as *tekke*s (Islamic monasteries), *dervish* lodges and Muslim theological schools of *medrese*s were removed. Clearly, for Kemalist elites, these religious institutions were incompatible with their civilizing mission. As will be shown in the next section, this would be one of the main reasons for division between the Turkish state and Kurds who were strongly attached to religious institutions in their social lives.

Ontological (in)security and the securitization of Kurdish tribal and religious structure

Having argued that modernity as Westernization was one of the pillars of Turkish identity in the early Republican period, this section analyzes how Kurds' tribal and religious structure became (and was constructed as) a source of ontological insecurity for the Turkish self between 1925 and 1960. It will be argued that the Sheikh Said rebellion, which broke out in 1925, was a turning point here: the rebellion threatened the security of the new Republic, not only in the sense of traditional survival logic, but also in the sense of ontological security. The rebellion generated ontological insecurity in the Turkish self by challenging its stability and certainty. To reinstate ontological security, state elites first constructed these elements of Kurdishness (tribal and religious structure) as threats against the Republic in the discourse and later followed assimilationist policies towards Kurds by which they aimed to melt those elements of Kurdishness that destabilized Turkish self-identity. The resettlement of Kurds was an important part of this

---

[45]   Here, it should be noted that the struggle of the founding elites was not with Islam *per se*, but with the interpretation of it. Aiming for a secular society, Kemalist elites constrained the power of religion to organize societal and political affairs. Hence, founding elites politicized those societal forces who asked for more of a role for religion in society. They were labelled political reactionists who want nothing but a return to *seriah* rule. The republican regime's self-proclaimed duty here was to protect the "real" Islam (secular, progressive, national) against those reactionary forces in the society. For more on this topic, please see Umut Azak, *Tükiye'de Laiklik ve İslam* [Secularism and Islam in Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2019).

assimilation policy and this section also focuses on the forced resettlements of Kurds and the legitimization strategies used in those resettlements during the 1920s and 1930s.

After the War of Independence, Republican elites pursued nationalist policies with an intense centralization which resulted in the denial of political and social rights to Kurds. Yet, this did not mean that Kurds were perceived as "internal others" before 1925. As previously mentioned, the new state had been considered an entity for all the Muslim elements of Anatolia. A clear shift occurred in the state-elites' perspective towards the Kurds after the Sheikh Said rebellion. The rebellion led by Sheikh Said quickly spread in south-eastern Anatolia and rebels took control of several districts in a short span of time. The rebellion, in this sense, threatened the physical security of the state. But, maybe equally important, the rebellion also posed a great threat to the ontological security of the state because the rebellion disrupted the constituting characteristics of Turkish self-identity. As previously stated, the decision-makers in the early Republican period were in the process of constructing Turkey as a modern, secular state. They had also thought that Muslim groups could be assimilated into Turkishness due to their religious bond and Turkish culture and language could play an important role in this assimilation.[46] However, the religious character of the rebellion against the cultural reforms of the new Republic and the fact that the rebellion was led by a Muslim group that did not want to be assimilated into Turkishness created a serious rupture in the narratives of state elites. As a result, the state elites perceived the rebellion as a threat to the sense of self and to the Turkishness they were attempting to constitute. Thus, there was an existential threat; not only against physical security but also against the ontological security of the state.[47]

A close look at the final decision speech of the chairman of the Court of Independence, which worked as criminal courts after the rebellion, could be enlightening in this sense:

---

[46] Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism.*
[47] Gökçe Balaban, "Tracing Turkey's Security Discourses and Practices vis-à-vis the Kurdish Issue" (PhD diss., Middle East Technical University, 2016), 71.

Your political reaction and rebellion were destroyed immediately by the decisive acts of the government of the Republic and by the fatal strokes of the Republican army…Everybody must know that as the young Republican government will definitely not condone any cursed action like incitement and *political reactionism*, it will prevent this sort of banditry by means of its precise precautions. The poor people of this region who have been exploited and oppressed under the domination of *sheikhs* and *feudal landlord*s will be freed from your incitements and evil and they will follow the efficient paths of our Republic which promises *progress* and *prosperity.*[48]

The first thing that could be noticed here is oppositional predications: while the Republic, as an active agent, is presented positively as representing "progress and prosperity," sheikhs and feudal landlords are represented negatively, as social "evils" against the ideals of the Republic. Thus, a difference of identity is constructed here – positive self-representation vs. negative other representation. What is also notable here is that Kurdish identity was not mentioned anywhere in the text explicitly and thus suppressed. However, whenever the socio-political structure of Kurds is considered, it may be argued that the Kurdish identity is hidden in the text rather than excluded. By defining agents and processes against the Republic as political reactionism, sheikhs and feudal landlords, the text implicitly shifts the axis from this particular rebellion to Kurdish identity because all these characteristics, namely religion, sheikhs, and feudal landlords, were important constituent parts of Kurdish political and social identity.[49] For one thing, religious institutions like *medreses* and *tarikats* were important bearers of Kurdish national identity.[50] Especially, sheikhs of the *tarikats* became so influential in the 19th century that they started to arbitrate disputes between tribes.[51] The tribes and the tribal structure (feudality as expressed in

---

[48] Ergun Aybars, İstiklal *Mahkemeleri (1920–1927)* (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1998) quoted in M. Yeğen, *Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler* [From Prospective Turk to So-Called Citizen: Republic and Kurds] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları: 2006), 128, *emphasis added.*
[49] Balaban, "Tracing Turkey's," 71.
[50] Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems," in *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, eds. Philip G. Kreyenbroek and S. Sperl (New York: Routledge, 1992): 33–67.
[51] Bruinessen, "Kurdish Society," 33–67.

the text), on the other hand, had been the most influential political organization in the Kurdish region for centuries.[52] They were the political institutions with some measure of territorial integrity.

Thus, it can be argued that after the Sheikh Said rebellion, Turkish state elites became aware that Kurdish political, social and cultural identity would disrupt the biographical continuity of the Turkish state and would generate ontological insecurity, because, as the Sheikh Said rebellion demonstrated, Kurds did not want to be assimilated into Turkishness and into the modernity and secularity of the new state. If it was the characteristics of Kurdishness which threatened the ontological security of the Turkish self, then to eliminate this threat, those characteristics of Kurdishness that created uncertainty in this self would have to be eliminated.[53] Therefore, many policies in this period and later on aimed to eliminate and/or assimilate the social and cultural traits of Kurdish identity. Resettlement of the Kurdish population was one of those policies whereby state elites wanted to abolish the tribal structure and eliminate the power of sheikhs in the region, which were significant characteristics of Kurdish identity. Looking into the legitimization discourses of resettlement laws also sheds light on how ontological security concerns of the state played an important role in assimilating the Kurdish identity.

The resettlement of Kurds after the Sheikh Said rebellion

After the Sheikh Said rebellion, republican elites started to resettle Kurds within the country in which ontological security concerns played an important role. This was clear in the reports prepared by the government after the rebellion with the purpose of eliminating future threats that may arise in the region.

---

52   Wadie Jwaideh, *Kürt Milliyetçiliği'nin Tarihi: Kökenleri ve Gelişimi* [The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development], trans. İsmail Çekem and Alper Duman (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999).
53   Balaban, "Tracing Turkey's," 72.

In September 1925, the government declared the "Reform Report for the East."[54] According to Article 9 of the report, the people who were thought to provoke and support the rebellion, or who were not found suitable to reside in the region by the government, would be transferred to specified neighborhoods in the west with their families. Immediately after the report, local elites and rich landholders were exiled from their territories and those territories were either distributed to peasants or seized by the Treasury Department.[55] What is striking here was that most of the deportees had not participated in the rebellion and what is more, some had even supported the state against the rebels.[56] Thus, resettlement could be considered an act of eliminating the power of landlords and sheikhs who were important carriers of Kurdish identity.

Another important resettlement law in this period was law No. 1097 – Law Regarding the Transfer of Certain Persons from the Eastern Regions to the Western Provinces - with which the government aimed to eliminate the feudal/tribal structure in the East.[57] In the justification part of the law, it was mentioned that there would be no *enlightenment* and *prosperity* in the region as long as these people and these groups - tribal chieftains and influential families - remained in the region. Here, it could again be seen that the republican elites used predication strategies with which they identified the republic with the positive values of enlightenment and prosperity against the "backward" character of Kurds. The tribal structure was presented as the carrier of this "backwardness" which should be dismantled. This logic reasserts the idea that one of the primary motives behind the resettlement policies in this period was eliminating the political and social characteristics of Kurd-

---

[54]   The report is an executive act which specified the policies of the state towards Kurdish populated region. For more, please see Mehmet Bayrak, *Şark Islahat Planı: Kürtlere Vurulan Kelepçe* [Reform Report for the East: Handcuff to Kurds] (İstanbul: Özge Yayınları, 2009).

[55]   Ercan Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet'in Diyarbakır'da Kimlik İnşası (1923–1950)* [The Identity Construction of the Republic in Diyarbakır 1923–1950)] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014).

[56]   Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet'in Diyarbakır'da Kimlik İnşası (1923–1950)*.

[57]   Bazı Eşhasın *Şark* Menatıkından Garp Vilayetlerine Nakline Dair Kanun [Law regarding the transfer of certain persons from the eastern regions to the western provinces], no. 1097, In TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi [Turkish Grand Assembly, Minutes of Debates], Vol. 33, Session 76 (June 1927), 155–159.

ish identity which were threatening the modern/secular identity of the new Republic.

The Resettlement Law of 1934 was another important population transfer move in this period. One of the most important points of the law was the suppression of Kurdish identity which was subsumed under Turkish identity.[58] In the text, Kurds were described as "nomads who are *not culturally Turkish*"[59], "people whose mother tongue *is not Turkish*"[60], "people who are *not of the Turkish race*."[61] Thus, their defining characteristic was lacking Turkishness and this situation should be "fixed" by the reorganization of their residency based on loyalty to Turkish culture.[62] This could be seen as an attempt to restore ontological security on the part of the state. By implementing the resettlement law, Turkish decision-makers aimed to assimilate Kurdish collective identity into Turkishness by detaching Kurds from Kurdish spatiality and mixing them with the Turkish population. As a result, Kurds would lose their threatening characteristics by being assimilated into the identity of the Turkish self.

Even though the pressure on tribal structure and sheikhs diminished in the later years of the republic, it did not end completely. Whenever the state elites felt threatened by Kurdish identity, they resorted to population policies. One example was the transfer of tribal chieftains and sheikhs to a camp in Sivas right after the 1960 coup. A few months later, most of them were released except fifty-five tribal chieftains and sheikhs who were dominant in the region. With the "Compulsory Settlement Law" issued on 19 October 1960 as an additional law to the Resettlement Law of 1934, these people were transferred to the western part of Turkey.[63] In Article 1 of the law, it was mentioned that those who were transferred were threatening the peace of residents in the region and damaging national interests by using religion, traditions and

---

[58] *İskân* Kanunu [Resettlement Law], no. 2510, Düstur [Code of Laws], Third Set, Vol. 15 (June 1934), 1156–1175.
[59] *İskan* Kanunu, Article 9.
[60] *İskan* Kanunu, Article 11.
[61] *İskan* Kanunu, Article 7.
[62] *İskan* Kanunu, Article 1.
[63] 2510 Sayılı İskan Kanuna Kanuna Ek Kanun [Additional Law to the Resettlement Law no. 2510], no. 105 (October 1960).

foreign ideologies. The clause is important in the sense of labelling the Kurdish tribal chieftains as "threats" and agents that challenge peace and threaten national interests. In the following years, with the increasing frequency of the use of national security terminology by the elites, Kurds' ethnic consciousness would incrementally be labelled with security terms such as "separatism" and "threat".

Securitization of Kurdish identity between 1960 and 1984

From the perspective of state elites, assimilation seemed to be working for two decades after the 1930s. There were no rebellions during this time period and Kurdishness had not been publicly expressed. The silence was broken in 1959 with the "trial of 49s." In 1959, a group of Kurdish students and intellectuals protested a speech made by the Republican People's Party representative Asım Eren, who demanded the use of violence against Kurds in order to avenge the killings of Turcomans in Northern Iraq.[64] The students sent a letter of protest to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and signed it "Kurds of Turkey." While the letter created unrest, it was not until the publication of Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter's poem "Qimil" in a Diyarbakır based magazine that the state took action against the signatories and intellectuals. The poem was in Kurdish, and was perceived as a satirical critique of the state, while it was also believed that the poem emphasized a "national revival" of Kurds.[65]

---

[64] In 1959 there was an attempted coup against General Abdulkerim Kasım, the Prime Minister of Iraq, by Arab General Sevaf. The coup started in Mosoul where Kurds were the majority. Abdulkerim Kasım had promised Mustafa Barzani autonomy for Kurds in northern Iraq and Barzani's troops supported Kasım against Sevaf's forces. Barzani was successful in suppressing this coup attempt. Later, Barzani harshly repressed the tribes who supported the coup and during these events two Turcomans were killed by Barzani's forces. See Ayşe Hür, "Kımıl Olayından 49'lar Davasına [From the Event of Quimil to the Case of 49s]," *Hak Söz Haber*, September 13, 2008, https://www.haksozhaber.net/kimil-olayindan-49lar-davasina-6614yy.htm.

[65] The poem was the story of a Kurdish peasant girl whose wheat crop turned into straw because of wheat bugs. At the end of the poem, Anter called out to the girl by saying: "Do not be sorry my sister, your brothers who are going to protect you from wheat bugs, sun pests, and all the other exploiters are rising now." (See Ayşe Hür, "*Kımıl Olayından*") Public opinion in

The first reactions against the letter and poem came from Turkish newspapers. When public reaction increased, the state took action and arrested fifty Kurdish intellectuals.[66] The public prosecutor charged accusations on Article 125 of the Penal Law, which specified that:

> those who try to put some or all part of state's territory under the sovereignty of a foreign country…., who tries to *separate* some parts of state's territory from state's authority is to be punished with aggravated life imprisonment.[67]

Even though it was Kurdishness which disrupted the state, Kurdish identity was not specified anywhere in the prosecutor's charge, and hence suppressed. Yet those who expressed Kurdishness were characterized as separatists threatening the state. If one thinks that language or the expression of Kurdishness could not establish a physical threat but only an ontological one, it becomes clear that ontological (in)security of the state was crucial in the securitization of the expression of Kurdish identity.

The trial of the Turkish Workers' Party (TWP) and its closure is also worth examining to see how the state reacted to the expression of Kurdish identity in the 1960s. From the beginning, the party attracted the interest of leftist Kurdish intellectuals whose presence also influenced the party discourse. In its first years, the party approached the Kurdish issue from the perspective of the economic inequality and economic backwardness of the East. Yet seeing the issue only from the economic perspective changed after 1966, when Kurdish groups became more influential in the party. At the party's fourth congress, the Kurdish issue was presented as an ethnic issue rather than an economic one. Accordingly, the party affirmed Kurdish existence against the denialist logic of

---

Turkey was that "wheat bugs, sun pests" referred to the Turkish state, and the brothers who are going to save the girl referred to Kurds, hence the poem was about the national revival of Kurds.
[66] The reason why it is called "the event of 49s" despite the detention of fifty intellectuals is that one of the detainees lost his life while in custody.
[67] Mülga Türk Ceza Kanunu [Abolished Turkish Penal Code], no. 765, Article 125 (March 1926).

the state and promised "to support the struggle of the Kurdish people to exercise all their constitutional rights."[68]

The clear expression of Kurdish identity and the emphasis on the constitutional rights of Kurds once more disturbed the self-identity of the state. Following the military memorandum in 1971, the party members were arrested and the party was banned because of the declarations made about the Kurdish issue. In the final decision regarding the party's ban, the Constitutional Court decided that the TWP had breached the first paragraph of the 57th Article of the Constitution which specifies that "the actions of the political parties should be in accordance with the principle of the *integrity* of the state with its territory and its nation."[69] Once again, the state labelled the expression of Kurdish identity a disrupting force against the state's integrity, constructing it as a separatist act in the discourse.

Another case worth looking into is the trial of the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts (RECH). The RECH was a legal network of clubs formed in 1969 with the objective of promoting Kurdish culture, enhancing solidarity among Kurdish youth, and fighting the feudal system in Turkey's Kurdistan region.[70] In October 1970, the leaders of the RECH were arrested and after the military memorandum, their trial was transferred to military court under the martial law command in Diyarbakır. The criminal charge of the military prosecutor against the members of the RECH is a clear reflection of the representation of Kurdish identity in the state discourse.

The prosecutor's charge begins by explaining the roots of Kurds and the history of Kurdishness[71]. Accordingly, the charge, relying on "historical data," tries to "prove" that Kurds' origins are traced back to

---

[68]   Tarık Ziya Ekinci, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi ve Kürtler* [Turkish Workers' Party and Kurds] (Istanbul: Sosyal TarihYayınları, 2010), 80–81.

[69]   Ekinci, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi ve Kürtler*, 93.

[70]   Mümtaz Kotan, *Yenilginin İzdüşümleri* [Footprints of Defeat] (Atina: Yunan Kürt Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 2003), 280–281; David. McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2007).

[71]   The translation here was made directly from the court file which was published in the magazine of *Toplum ve Kuram*. See "Kürt Meselesi'nin Tarihi ile Yüzleşmek: DDKO Dava Dosyası'nda Türk Milliyetçiliği-Irkçılığı [Facing with the history of the Kurdish issue: Turkish nationalism-racism in the court file of RECH]," *Toplum ve Kuram* 2, (2009): 239–246.

Central Asia and since Central Asia is the homeland of Turkic tribes, Kurds are naturally Turks[72]. Kurds are Turks from the Oghuz tribe who migrated in 3000 B.C. to the territory they live in today and the language of the Kurds is nothing but Turkish. Still, even today most of the words that Kurmanji (a Kurdish group) use are Asian and Central Anatolian Turkish, but since they were neighbors with Armenians and Iranians, they were forced to use words from Armenian and Persian.[73] Deriving from the Turkishness of the Kurds, the prosecutor reached the conclusion that Kurdishness claims made by the RECH leaders could be nothing but the "provocation of the enemies" and those people "aim to destroy Turkey by undermining Turkey's national integrity."

This time Kurds were included in the text, but their inclusion was an attempt to reinstate the autobiographical narrative that all Anatolian people had Turkic roots. In addition, once more, Kurdishness was perceived and constituted in terms of security: its expression could be nothing but the provocation of the enemies who try to destroy the state's integrity and national unity. From the perspective of ontological security, Kurdishness as expressed by the RECH disrupted the story the Turkish state had been telling itself about its identity for the last three decades (that Anatolia was a land of Turks and Kurdish is not a separate language), and therefore generated ontological insecurity for the Turkish state. Thus, the very existence of the RECH became a threat to the

---

[72]   Despite the Turkish state's efforts to deny Kurdishness and its perspective of seeing Kurds as Turks, Kurds establish a distinct ethnic group in the southeastern and eastern part of Turkey, northern part of Iraq, northeastern part of Syria and northwestern part of Iran. Although there are debates about the ancestry of Kurds, since the 16th century there has been a consensus on both Ottoman and Iranian resources to call tribes living in this region Kurds. Those tribes were distinctive mostly because of their language: they neither spoke Turkish, nor Persian nor Arabic. For more on this topic please see Martin van Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik: Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri* [Kurdishness, Turkishness and Alevism: Religious and Ethnic Identity Struggles], trans. Hakan Yurdakul (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 59.

[73]   It should be stressed that etymological studies do not support this argument. Many studies demonstrate that Kurdish belongs to the Indo-European language family rather than Uralic-Altalic, which Turkish belongs to. For more on the etymology of Kurdish please see Ernest McCarus, "Kurdish Language Studies," *Middle East Journal* 14, no. 3 (Summer 1960): 325–335. Based on linguistic evidence, some scholars classified Kurds with the Iranian people, rather than with Asiatic groups, such as Turks. See Vladimir Minorsky, "Kurds and Kurdistan," in *Encylopedia of Islam, Vol. 5*, eds. Clifford Edmund Bosworth, Van Donzel, B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986): 447–449.

ontological security of the state, for it emphasized Kurdishness, and this is why the discourse of security was dominant in the prosecutor's charge.

Securitization of Kurdish identity further increased after the 1980 military coup. One example of this can be seen in a book prepared by the Turkish Land Forces Command in 1982 in which separatist and destructive elements were identified. According to the book, Kurdism was the most effective separatism in the country. The argumentation of this discourse bears similarities with the RECH trial. The book claims that there are no Kurds in Turkey and the word Kurd derives from the sound heard when walking on the thin layer of snow in the mountains.[74] This snow is called Kurdish snow or Kurdun, and that is why Turks living in snow-covered places are called Kurds. Since Kurds were Turks, those who emphasized Kurdishness were nothing but separatists.

The 1980 regime also took very harsh measures against the Kurdish language, since it saw Kurdish as a force that undermined "national security" and "public order." "The law on publications that will be made in languages other than Turkish" prohibited "expressing, publishing and spreading the thoughts on languages other than those mother tongues of the countries recognized by the Turkish state."[75] Without a doubt, the law aimed to prevent the use of the Kurdish language. It was clear in the purpose of the law that the state saw the Kurdish language as a threat to itself. Accordingly, the objective of the law was specified as the "protection of national security and public order"[76]. Describing the Kurdish language as a threat to national security once more demonstrates how securitization of Kurdish identity and the extraordinary measures that followed provided the state the ontological security it was seeking in the Kurdish issue.

---

[74] *Türkiye'de Yıkıcı ve Bölücü Akımlar*, 43.
[75] Türkçe'den Başka DillerdeYapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun [The Law on Publications that will be made in Languages Other than Turkish], no. 2932 (November 1983).
[76] Türkçe'den Başka DillerdeYapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun, Article 2.

Conclusion

Since the intensification of violence on the part of the PKK, there is a tendency in Turkish state discourse to associate the Kurdish issue with terrorism. This article has tried to put forward that this specific discursive construction did not start after the terrorist activities of the PKK but long before it. Accordingly, since the Sheikh Said rebellion, the state relied on security discourse and the social, political and cultural characteristics of Kurdish identity were securitized, mostly by characterizing them with labels of "threats" and "separatism." The article argued that behind this securitization lies the ontological (in)security concerns of the state. Ontological security refers to the security of self-identity as opposed to the security of the body. The continuity in self-identity is crucial for actors' feelings of ontological security. From this perspective, the expression of Kurdish identity disrupted the continuity of the story that the Turkish self was recounting about who it was. For one thing, the Kurdish rebellions between 1925 and 1930 demonstrated that not all Muslim groups would be willing to assimilate into Turkishness and to adopt Turkish culture and language. What is more, the tribal structure and sheikhdom important for Kurdish socio-political identity also threatened the "modern nation-state" ideal of the new Republic. Thus, there was a group within the nation that did not want to be assimilated into Turkishness, and more importantly, the ethnic characteristics of this group threatened the new state's "modern" identity.

While this perception of threat led to the securitization of Kurdish identity in state discourse, it also affected the policies of the state towards Kurds. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Turkish state carried out a policy of forced resettlement by which the Kurdish population and Kurdish notables were transferred to western parts of the country. The aim was to suppress the ethnic traits of Kurds which generated ontological insecurity. After the 1960s, suppression took the form of arresting Kurdish people or closing Kurdish associations who publicly expressed their Kurdishness. With the 1980 military regime, emphasizing Kurdishness was considered equal to separatism and expression of the Kurdish language was banned by the regime with the aim of protecting national security.

Lastly, one may reflect on the relevance of this article to the ongoing Kurdish issue. From the ontological security perspective, it could be argued that the emphasis of Kurdishness by the PKK after 1984 may have generated further ontological insecurity for the Turkish state because of its disruption of dominant narratives. This has led to further securitization of the Kurdish issue. From the ontological security perspective, any solution of the Kurdish issue today requires establishing new narratives about Turkishness that would not see Kurdishness as a threat to itself. If Kurdish identity could be seen not as an internal other, but as a part of the self, with its distinctive character, ontological insecurity of the state towards Kurdishness may fall away.

B i b l i o g r a p h y

2510 Sayılı İskan Kanuna Kanuna Ek Kanun [Additional Law to the Resettlement Law no. 2510], no. 105 (October 1960).

Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I-III. Ankara: Divan Yayıncılık, 2006.

Azak, Umut. *Türkiye'de Laiklik ve İslam* [Secularism and Islam in Turkey]. İstanbul: İletişim, 2019.

Balaban, Gökçe. "Tracing's Turkey's Security Discourses and Practices vis-à-vis the Kurdish Issue." PhD diss., Missle East Technical University, 2016.

Bayrak, Mehmet. *Şark Islahat Planı: Kürtlere Vurulan Kelepçe* [Reform Report for the East: Handcuff to Kurds]. İstanbul: Özge Yayınları, 2009.

Bazı Eşhasın *Şark* Menatıkından Garp Vilayetlerine Nakline Dair Kanun [Law regarding the transfer of certain persons from the eastern regions to the western provinces], no. 1097. In TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi [Turkish Grand Assembly, Minutes of Debates], Vol. 33, Session 76 (June 1927), 155–159.

Bruinessen, Martin van. "Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems." In *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, edited by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, 33–67. New York: Routledge, 1992.

Bruinessen, Martin van. *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik: Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri* [Kurdishness, Turkishness and Alevism: Ethnic and Religious Identity Struggles]. Translated by Hakan Yurdakul. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.

Cağaptay, Soner. *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk*. Oxon: Routledge, 2006.

Cağlayan, Ercan. *Cumhuriyet'in Diyarbakır'da Kimlik İnşası (1923–1950)* [The Identity Construction of the Republic in Diyarbakır 1923–1950]. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014.

Croft, Stuart. "Constructing Ontological insecurity: The Insecuritization of Britian's Muslims." *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 2 (June 2012): 219–235.

Delehanty, K. Will and Brent J. Steele. "Engaging the Narrative in Onto-logical (In)Security Theory: Insights from Feminist IR." *Cambridge Review of International Studies* 22, no. 3 (September 2009): 523–540.

Ekinci, Ziya Tarık. *Türkiye İşçi Partisi ve Kürtler* [Turkish Workers' Party and Kurds]. İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları, 2010.

Giddens, Anthony. *The Consequences of Modernity*. London: Standford University Press, 1990.

Giddens, Anthony. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. London: Standford University Press, 1991.

Gökalp, Ziya. *The Principles of Turkism*. (n.p.): Bill Archive, 1968.

Huysmans, Jef. "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Sig-nifier." *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (June 1998): 226–255.

Hür, Ayşe. "'Kımıl' Olayından 49'lar Davası'na." *HakSöz Haber*, July 13, 2008. https://www.haksozhaber.net/kimil-olayindan-49lar-davasina-6614yy.htm.

İskân Kanunu [Resettlement Law], no. 2510. Düstur [Code of Laws], Third Set, vol. 15 (June 1934), 1156–1175.

Jwaideh, Wadie. *Kürt Milliyetçiliği'nin Tarihi: Kökenleri ve Gelişimi* [The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development]. Translated by İsmail Çekem and Alper Duman. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999.

Kaygusuz, Özlem. "Modern Türk Vatandaşlığı Kavramının Erken Öncülleri: Milli Mücadele Döneminde Ulusal Vatandaşlığın Kuruluşu [The Early Ante-cedents of Modern Turkish Citizenship: The Construction of National Citizen-ship in National Struggle]." *Ankara* Üniversitesi *SBF Dergisi* 60, no. 2 (2005): 195–217.

Keyman, Fuat and Umut Özkırımlı "The 'Kurdish Question' revisited: Modernity, Nationalism and Citizenship in Turkey." In *Understanding Turkey's Kurdish Question*, edited by Fevzi Bilgin and Ali Sarıhan. Lanham: Lexington Books, 1997.

Kotan, Mümtaz. *Yenilginin* İzdüşümleri [Footprints of Defeat]. Atina: Yunan Kürt Dostluk Derneği Yayınları, 2003.

Krolikowski, Alanna. "State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Skeptical View." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 1 (July 2008): 109–133.

285

"Kürt Meselesi'nin Tarihi ile Yüzleşmek: DDKO Dava Dosyası'nda Türk Milliyetçiliği-Irkçılığı [Confronting History of the Kurdish Issue: Turkish Nationalism in DDKO Case File]." *Toplum ve Kuram* 2 (2009): 239–246.

Laing, Ronald David. *The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness*. London: Penguin Books, 1990.

Leeuwen, V. Theo. *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Analysis*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Lupovici, Amir. "Ontological Dissonance, Clashing Identities, and Israel's Unilateral Steps towards the Palestinians." *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 4 (October 2012): 809–833.

McCarus, Ernest. "Kurdish Language Studies." *Middle East Journal* 14, no. 3 (Summer 1960): 325–335.

McDowall, David. *A Modern History of the Kurds*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2007.

Minorsky, Vladimir. "Kurds and Kurdistan." In *Encylopedia of Islam, Vol. 5*, edited by Clifford Edmund Bosworth, Van Donzel, B. Lewis, CH. Pellat, 438–486. Leiden: E. J: Brill, 1986.

Mitzen, Jennifer. "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma." *European Journal of International Relations*, 12, no. 3 (September 2006): 341–353.

Mülga Türk Ceza Kanunu [Abolished Turkish Penal Code], no. 765, Article 125 (March 1926).

Özcan, Gencer, "Türkiye'de Milli Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi" [The Development of the Concept of National Security in Turkey]. In *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti* [Military, State and Security Politics in Turkey], edited by İsmet Akça and Evren Balta Paker 307–351. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010.

Parla, Taha and Andrew Davison. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004.

Reisigl, Martin and Ruth Wodak. *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Anti-Semitism*. London: Routledge, 2011.

Rumelili, Bahar. *Conflict Resolurion and Ontological Security: Peace anxieties*. Oxon: Routledge, 2015.

Steele, J. Brent. "Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British and the American Civil War." *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 3 (July 2005): 519–540.

Steele, J. Brent. *Ontological Security in International Relations*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Subotic, Jelena. "Narrative, Ontological Security and Foreign Policy Change." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 4 (October 2016): 610–627.

TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi [Transactions of Proceedings of Turkish Grand National Assembly], Vol. 2, Session: 10. December 19, 1920.

TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi [Transactions of Proceedings of Turkish Grand National Assembly], Vol. 8/1, Session 42. April 20, 1924.

Türkçe'den Başka DillerdeYapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun [The Law on Publications that will be made in Languages Other than Turkish], no. 2932 (November 1983).

Türkiye'de Yıkıcı ve Bölücü Akımlar [Destructive and Seperatist Movements in Turkey]. Ankara: Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Yayınları, 1982.

Weaver, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization." In *On security*, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Yeğen, Mesut. *Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler* [From Prospective Turk to So-Called Citizen: Republic and Kurds]. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.